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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
HELENE SIMSON*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews selected domestic relations cases decided during
the Survey year. The article is divided into three sections: Jurisdiction,
Custody and Visitation, and Property Division. The Property Division
section includes a review of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses
Protection Act.
II. JURISDICTION

The New Mexico Supreme Court decided two cases involving state
court jurisdiction over Indians and Indian property in the context of family
law during the Survey year. ' In both cases the aggrieved party has sought
review by the United States Supreme Court.
In Lonewolf v. Lonewolf,2 Wife was non-Indian, Husband was Indian
and an enrolled member of the Santa Clara Pueblo. Wife filed a petition
for legal separation. Husband counterclaimed for divorce, and in his
Answer and Counterclaim challenged the state court's jurisdiction over
both the parties' real property located within the Santa Clara Pueblo and
their personal property located on and off the reservation. The district
court found it lacked jurisdiction over the real property on the reservation,
but took jurisdiction to decide issues involving the parties' personal property.'

The parties then stipulated to the division of most of their personal
property, but the stipulation failed to include the value or distribution of
fifty-eight pieces of existing, but missing Indian pottery. After a hearing,
the trial court determined the missing pottery was community property,
and the value of the community interest in the pottery was $56,618. After
ascertaining various deductions and credits, the court found that Husband
owed Wife $18,309.' Husband5 appealed, and the supreme court affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Lonewolf v. Lonewolf, 99 N.M. 300, 657 P.2d 627, cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3422 (U.S.
Nov. 29, 1983) (No. 82-1564); State ex rel. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 660
P.2d 590, cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-2049).
2. 99 N.M. 300, 657 P.2d 627 (1983).
3. Id. at 301, 657 P.2d at 628.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 300, 657 P.2d at 627.
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Quoting Williams v. Lee, 6 the supreme court set out the test for the
exercise of state court power over matters involving Indians: "whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them." 7 The court further noted that Chino v.
Chino' established three criteria in New Mexico for determining the
application of the infringement test in Williams: "(1) whether the parties
are Indians or non-Indians, (2) whether the cause of action arose within
the Indian reservation, and (3) what is the nature of the interest to be
protected." 9 Using these criteria, the supreme court held that by taking
jurisdiction over the personal property in this case, the state did not
infringe upon Indian self-government, and therefore, jurisdiction was
proper.
Although the parties did not present the issue to the supreme court as
one of first impression, this was the first case in New Mexico to address
the narrow question of whether the state court has subject matter jurisdiction incident to a divorce to divide personal property acquired during
marriage by an Indian and non-Indian. Applying the Chino criteria, it
was undisputed that one of the parties was Indian and the other was nonIndian. The supreme court implicitly found that the second Chino criterion
also was satisfied because the issue of the property settlement arose in
connection with the divorce in state court. The court relied on N.M. Stat.
Ann. §40-3-14 (1978)0 to hold that Wife had the power to control and
dispose of the community property and that this right traveled with her;
it was not attached to tribal land." The court did not analyze the third
Chino criterion.
The court found that Husband submitted to the state court's jurisdiction
when he filed his counterclaim and when he stipulated to the value and
distribution of most of the parties' personal property. The court held that
Husband could not then challenge the state court's jurisdiction as to only
the pottery in question.' 2 The court was correct in recognizing that by
appearing in the action, Husband submitted himself to the personal jurisdiction of the court. The supreme court, however, did not specifically
analyze whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the property. Sub6. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
7. Id. at 220.
8. 90 N.M. 203, 561 P.2d 476 (1977).
9. Id. at 206, 561 P.2d at 479.
10. 99 N.M. at 301, 657 P.2d at 628.
11. The statute provides that "... either spouse alone has full power to manage, control, dispose
of and encumber the entire community personal property."
12. 99 N.M. at 302, 657 P.2d at 629. The court acknowledged that the property in question was
located on the Santa Clara reservation. Id. at 300, 657 P.2d at 627. At the time of their separation
and for several years before, the parties' home, studio, gallery, and business were on the reservation.
Record at 75. The missing pots had been left in Husband's possession on the reservation. Record
at 88.

Winter 1984]

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

3
ject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. This case could
be viewed as involving the principle of "divisible divorce,' 4 whereby
the state court has jurisdiction to alter the marital status of the parties,
but may lack subject5matter jurisdiction to divide personal property located
on the reservation. '
6
State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Jojola involved a suit
by the Department of Human Services ("DHS") against Jojola to establish
paternity and to compel child support. DHS alleged that Jojola was the
natural father of a minor child. The child's mother applied for public
assistance and assigned her right to support to the state. Jojola, the mother,
and the minor child were all residents and members of Isleta Pueblo. On
Jojola's motion, the trial court dismissed DHS's petition for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.'" The state appealed.
On appeal, Jojola argued that the Isleta Pueblo had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the domestic relations of its members. The supreme court
invoked both the Williams infringement test,' 8 and the Chino criteria for
determining whether the test was met. '"The court considered each of the
Chino criteria, found there was no infringement of Indian self-govern2
ment, reversed the trial court, and remanded the case. " The supreme
court held that when the mother assigned her right to compel support to
DHS, a non-Indian party, DHS became subrogated to the mother's position and had the right as the real party in interest to compel support
directly from the father. The suit, therefore, was between an Indian and
a non-Indian. The mother's request for public assistance and the assignment of her right satisfied the second Chino criterion. In addition, the
court agreed with DHS that the interest to be protected was the state's
interest in the uniform enforcement of paternity determinations and child
support obligations, and21 not the tribe's interest in regulating the domestic
affairs of its members.
In March 1983, Jojola appealed the supreme court decision to the
United States Supreme Court.2 2 In July 1983, DHS moved to dismiss the
13. See Chavez v. County of Valencia, 86 N.M. 205, 521 P.2d 1154 (1974).
14. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948).
15. For a thorough analysis of the issues raised in Lonewolf, see Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104
Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1982).
16. 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590 (1983).
17. Id. at 501, 660 P.2d at 591. Jojola also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
over him. The court found that it had personal jurisdiction over him because he had been served
with the petition and summons at the campus of the Albuquerque Technical Vocational Institute
outside of the Isleta Pueblo. Id. at 502, 660 P.2d at 592.
18. See supra text accompanying note 7.
19. See supra text accompanying note 8.
20. 99 N.M. at 500, 660 P.2d at 590.
21. Id. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593.
22. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 52 U.S.L.W. 3260 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-2049).
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appeal as moot because on July 1, 1983, DHS promulgated a new policy
governing the procedure to be followed in all cases seeking to establish
paternity and compel child support where the mother, the child, and the
putative father are all Indians residing on a reservation.23 The policy
defers to Indian tribal sovereignty and recognizes the right of the tribes
to regulate the domestic relations of their members. It provides that if all
the parties are subject to tribal court jurisdiction, the natural mother will
bring the paternity action in her own name in tribal court, and the Child
Support Enforcement Bureau will not seek to sue the father in state court.2 4
Pursuant to the regulation, the mother filed a paternity and child support
action in Isleta Tribal Court, represented by a DHS attorney.2" Before the
case was heard on remand in the state district court, DHS moved to
dismiss on the ground that the issue would be pursued in the Isleta Tribal
Court. The motion was granted over Jojola's objection and the suit was
dismissed without prejudice. 26
III. CUSTODY AND VISITATION
During the Survey year, the supreme court decided the first two cases
arising under the New Mexico Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (NMCCJA). 27
In each case, the court demonstrated how the Act is to be construed to
determine which of two competing states has jurisdiction over visitation
rights.
Olsen v. Olsen2" was the first case to construe the NMCCJA. The mother
and child had moved to New Mexico in 1976, and the parties were
divorced in Wyoming in 1977. The divorce decree provided that the father
would have summer visitation with the child starting in 1980, when the
child was six years old. In the summer of 1980, the child visited the
father in Wyoming. The father instituted change of custody proceedings
there, and refused to return the child. The parties modified the visitation
by stipulation entered in the Wyoming court. The child returned to New
Mexico that summer and lived with her mother. The father moved to
Oklahoma during 1981.
On April 7, 1981, before the effective date of the NMCCJA, 2 9 the
mother brought suit in New Mexico to modify further the father's visitation rights. On October 18, 1981, after the'effective date of the NMCCJA,
23. For a description-of the policy, see 3 Dep't. of Human Serv. Income Support Div. Program
Manual § 529 (1983).
24. Id.
25. 99 N.M. at 501, 660 P.2d at 591.
26. Id.
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§40-10-1 to -24 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
28. 98 N.M. 644, 651 P.2d 1288 (1982).
29. The Act became effective on July 1, 1981. 1981 N.M. Laws ch. 119 §26.
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the court entered an order limiting the father to visiting with the child in
Quay County for the first three visits, and thereafter for two or three days
at a time only in New Mexico. The supreme court held that the case was
controlled by the NMCCJA. 30 Under the Act, custody determination includes determination of visitation rights. 3
The supreme court found that New Mexico had the necessary jurisdiction to modify the Wyoming decree.32 New Mexico may modify a
foreign custody decree only if the foreign court no longer has jurisdiction
under requirements substantially in accordance with the NMCCJA or has
declined to assume jurisdiction, and the New Mexico court has jurisdiction
under the NMCCJA.33 The court concluded that at the time of the New
Mexico proceedings, the Wyoming court did not have jurisdiction to
modify its decree.34 In 1981, none of the prerequisites to jurisdiction were
met in Wyoming."
30. 98 N.M. at 646, 651 P.2d at 1290. In Tufares v. Wright, 98 N.M. 8, 644 P.2d 522 (1982),
the court held that the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (A) (Supp.
IV 1980), controlled a case that was pending at the time the Act became effective.
31. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-10-3(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
32. 98 N.M. at 647, 651 P.2d at 1291.
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-10-15 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
34. 98 N.M. at 647, 651 P.2d at 1291.
35. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-10-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) provides that:
A. A district court of New Mexico which is competent to decide child custody
matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial decree
or modification decree under the following circumstances if:
(1) New Mexico:
(a) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the
proceeding; or
(b) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from New Mexico because
of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in New
Mexico;
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a district court of New Mexico
assume jurisdiction because:
(a) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with New Mexico; and
(b) there is available in New Mexico substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships;
(3) the child is physically present in New Mexico and:
(a) the child has been abandoned; or
(b) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has
been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected; or
(4) it appears that:
(a) no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially
in accordance with Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection, or another
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that New Mexico
is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; and
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Following the provisions of the NMCCJA, 36 the supreme court then
found that New Mexico had jurisdiction to modify the Wyoming decree.37
New Mexico was the home state of the child, and she had significant
connections with New Mexico. The trial court heard substantial evidence
concerning the child's present and future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships, and no other state appeared to have jurisdiction
at the time of the New Mexico proceedings. The supreme court affirmed
the trial court's assumption of jurisdiction.3
In Serna v. Salazar,39 the supreme court reversed a trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to modify visitation rights. The parties
were divorced in California in 1977, and the decree awarded custody of
two minor children to the mother and granted the father reasonable visitation rights. The mother and children moved to New Mexico in 1978,
and the children remained here except for a visit to the father in California
in the summer of 1980. In October 1980, the father sought to modify the
divorce decree in California, and was granted one month's visitation
rights. In May 1981, the mother brought an action in New Mexico to
further modify the father's visitation rights. The trial court granted the
father's motion to decline jurisdiction, and the mother appealed.
As in Olsen, the first inquiry was whether California still had jurisdiction under jurisdictional requirements substantially in accordance with
the NMCCJA. 4° The supreme court found that it did not. California was
not the home state of the children, and the children had no significant
connection with California at the time of the New Mexico proceedings.
The substantial evidence concerning the children's care, protection, training, and personal relationships was in New Mexico, not California. The
children were not present in California at the time of the California
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that the New Mexico district court
assume jurisdiction.
B. Except as provided under Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Subsection A of this
section, physical presence in New Mexico of the child, or of the child and
one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a district
court of New Mexico to make a child custody determination.
C. Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
The Wyoming CCJA has prerequisites for jurisdiction substantially in accordance with New Mexico's.
See Wyo. Stat. § 20-5-104 (1977). Both New Mexico and Wyoming require compliance with only
one of the prerequisites to establish jurisdiction.
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-10-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
37. Olsen, 98 N.M. at 647, 651 P.2d at 1291.
38. Id. at 648, 651 P.2d at 1292. The father also appealed the trial court's holding that there was
a change in circumstances sufficient to strictly limit his visitation rights in the child's best interest.
The supreme court reviewed the record and affirmed the trial court on this issue. Id.
39. 98 N.M. 648, 651 P.2d 1292 (1982).
40. Id. at 650, 651 P.2d at 1294. The California Child Custody Jurisdictional Act's prerequisites
for jurisdiction are practically identical to those of New Mexico. See Cal. Civ. Code § 5152(1) (West
1983).
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modification, and the court found that it would be in the best interest of
the children for New Mexico to assume jurisdiction. The supreme court
then found that New Mexico had jurisdiction as the home state of the
children when the action was commenced, 4 ' and reversed the trial court.42
The conclusion that California did not have jurisdiction at the time of the
New Mexico proceedings is not as clear as the conclusion about Wyoming's lack of jurisdiction in Olsen. In Serna, the California court did
take jurisdiction in October 1980 to modify its decree at a time when the
children's situation was the same as it was in May 1981. The supreme
court noted that the situation in October 1980 was not relevant at the
time of the New Mexico proceedings.
IV. PROPERTY DIVISION
A. Transmutation
The situation where divorced parties remarried each other and divorced
again gave rise to the issue in two cases of the transmutation of separate
property into community property.43 Transmutation is a term to describe
arrangements between spouses to change the legal status of their property
from separate to community and from community to separate. The party
alleging transmutation must establish it by clear and convincing evidence."
In Nichols v. Nichols,45 the parties first married in 1972, and resided
in a house in Roswell that Husband had bought in 1970. This house
remained Husband's separate property (subject to a community lien) at
the time of the first divorce in May 1975. The parties remarried in June
1975. During the second marriage, Husband sold the Roswell house and
placed the proceeds in the joint checking and joint savings accounts of
the parties. The parties then bought a house in Ruidoso, with the down
payment and all subsequent payments on the real estate contract for this
property coming from the joint checking account. The parties placed the
real estate contract in both their names. 46At the time of the second divorce,
the trial court found that husband had made a gift of his separate property
to the community and further held that the Ruidoso house was community
property.
41. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-10-4(A)(l)(a) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
42. 98 N.M. at 651, 651 P.2d at 1295.
43. Nichols v. Nichols, 98 N.M. 322, 648 P.2d 780 (1982); Allen v. Allen, 98 N.M. 652, 651
P.2d 1296 (1982).
44. Allen, 98 N.M. at 654, 651 P.2d at 1298.
45. 98 N.M. 322, 648 P.2d 780 (1982).
46. Id. at 327, 648 P.2d at 785. The deed was not introduced into evidence at trial nor was it
the subject of trial testimony. The testimony concerned only the real estate contract. 98 N.M. at
328 n.3, 648 P.2d at 654 n. 3.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

On appeal, the supreme court reviewed the law in New Mexico regarding transmutation of separate property into community property. The
analysis included a two-step process. The first step was to ascertain the
original legal status of the property, which is fixed by the manner and
the time of its acquisition. Property acquired by either spouse, or both,
during marriage is presumed to be community property.47 This presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence . In this case,
Husband rebutted the presumption by tracing the funds used to acquire
the Ruidoso property to the proceeds of the sale of his Roswell house.
Wife then had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence
the second step of the analysis, the transmutation of this separate property
into community property. 49 The supreme court concluded that Wife met
this burden by proving Husband's intent to make a gift to the community
of his separate property. That the real estate contract was in both parties'
names, by itself, was not clear and convincing evidence of the gift. That
fact, however, coupled with the commingling of Husband's separate funds
in the joint account, and evidence that there had been community expenditures from the joint checking account other than payments on the
house, was sufficient for the court to find the occurrence of transmutation."
In Allen v. Allen, 5 the parties remarried on April 9, 1979. In August
1979, Wife bought the property in question with her separate funds and
took title "as a single woman." Three months later, Wife executed a
standard quit claim deed transferring the property to herself and Husband.
The deed did not describe how the property was to be held. The parties
did not dispute that the property was first purchased with separate funds,
so the first step presumption did not apply. The supreme court found that
the deed alone was not clear and convincing evidence of transmutation,
2
and held that the property remained Wife's separate property.1
B. Value of Community Interest in Professional Corporation
In Hertz v. Hertz,53 the supreme court again5 4 reviewed the valuation
of the community's interest in a professional corporation at the time of
47. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-3-12(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
48. Nichols, 98 N.M. at 327, 648 P.2d at 785.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 330, 648 P.2d at 788.
51. 98 N.M. 652, 651 P.2d 1296 (1982).
52. Id. at 654-55, 651 P.2d at 1298-99. See also Corley v. Corley, 92 N.M. 716, 594 P.2d 1172
(1979).
53. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983). Hertz involved several issues of divorce law, including
the award of alimony, award of attorney fees and costs, compensation to the spouse out of possession
of the community residence, the right to immediate possession of a spouse's share of the community
property, as well as the valuation of the community's interest in the business and the valuation of
the community's interest in Husband's profit sharing plan. This article will discuss only the last two
issues.
54. See Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980).
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dissolution. Husband was a shareholder in a large law firm. At trial, the
essential difference between the parties was in the accounting method
used to evaluate the worth of their 2,715 shares in the professional corporation.55 Wife's expert used the accrual basis56 to determine that each
share was worth $17.32. Using a capitalization of excess earnings method,
he then added $6.49 per share for goodwill, for an aggregate community's
interest of $64,644.15. This amount included the corporation's deferred
compensation plan, but not its profit sharing plan. Husband's expert, on
the other hand, used a cash basis,5 7 and put the value of each share at
$4.28.58 Husband added nothing for goodwill because the corporation
had a stock restriction agreement that "[g]oodwill, leases, contract rights
and the like will be valued in the aggregate at $1.00 . . . " The trial
court followed Wife's accrual accounting method. From the total value
to the community of $64,644.15, the court subtracted the community's
interest in the deferred compensation plan ($3,666). The court also subtracted $11,620, which was the number of shares multiplied by $4.28,
the price per share fixed by the corporation in its stock transfer agreement.6 The trial court awarded each party one-half of the remaining
community value of $49,357.95.
On appeal, Husband argued successfully that the cash basis value of
$4.28 per share by the corporation was the appropriate calculation, and
that the value for goodwill was fixed at $1.00 by the stock restriction
6
agreement. The supreme court reiterated its holding from Hurley v. Hurley '
that once the existence of goodwill is established, it should be valued
and divided as community property. In this case, Husband proved that
the value of the goodwill was $1.00 by showing that all prior transfers
of the corporation's stock were done on a cash basis value and were
limited by the $1.00 value for goodwill as the shareholders had agreed.
The supreme court held that because Husband was bound by the agreement
of the shareholders, it would be inequitable to award Wife more than he
would get if he terminated his employment.
55. The supreme court stated that parties owned 2,175 shares. Hertz, 99 N.M. at 324, 657 P.2d
at 1173. This statement must have resulted from a transposition of numbers, as the subsequent
mathematics is correct only if 2,715 shares were owned.
56. The wife's accrual basis figures included work in progress and accounts receivable.
57. The husband's cash basis figures excluded work in progress and accounts receivable.
58. 99 N.M. at 324, 657 P.2d at 1173. This was also the value per share that the corporation
had established in its stock transfer agreement. Id.
59. Id. at 325, 657 P.2d at 1174.
60. Id. at 324, 657 P.2d at 1173. It is difficult to understand why the trial court subtracted this
amount, because in arriving at the $64,644.15 total, the wife's expert had valued each share at
$17.32 before adding anything for goodwill. It is possible that the court found as a fact that the
corporation valued each share at $4.28 on a cash basis, but agreed with the wife that it was
unreasonable not to include in the value such assets as work in progress and accounts receivable
owned by the corporation at the time of the divorce, which she valued at over one million dollars.
61. 94 N.M. at 644, 615 P.2d at 259. In Hurley, the supreme court approved the capitalization
of excess earnings method of valuing goodwill, but held it was not the exclusive method. Id.
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C. Value of Profit-SharingPlan
Another issue in Hertz was the valuation of the community interest in
the corporation's profit-sharing plan. The plan provided for yearly valuation on June 30, the last day of the corporation's taxable year. The
plan also provided that "all contributions to the trust will be considered
for trust accounting purposes as having been made on the Valuation Date
coincident with or next following the last day of the Company's taxable
year for which the contribution is made, regardless of when actually
made. "62 The board of directors of the corporation authorized the allocation of $5,000 per month for inclusion in the plan.
The total value of the plan on June 30, 1979 was $61,880.40. The
date of the divorce was December 31, 1979. The trial court found the
value of the plan to be $121,880.40, which was the value on June 30,
1980. The supreme court held that it was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion to value the plan six months after the community was dissolved.
The court held that the proper evaluation date was the date of divorce
and the community should have the benefit of the $30,000 that had accrued
to the plan between June and December 1979.63
D. Military Retirement Pay
During the Survey year, the supreme court, in Whenry v. Whenry, 64
consolidated six cases6" for appeal to decide the issue of the retroactive
application of McCarty v. McCarly,66 in which the United States Supreme

Court ruled that military retirement benefits were not property subject to
division on dissolution of marriage. In each of the six cases, the trial
court had granted the divorce and divided the military retirement pay
between the spouses before the Court's decision in McCarty.67 After
McCarty, each of the six military spouses sought relief from the final
divorce decree. In five of the cases, the trial court denied relief. In
62. 97 N.M. at 328, 657 P.2d at 1177 (emphasis added).
63. See Neerken, New Mexico Community Property Law and the Division of Retirement Plan
Benefits Pursuant to the Dissolution of Marriage, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 641 (1983) for a discussion of
how the New Mexico Supreme Court has divided various types of retirement plans upon divorce,
and commending the court on its flexibility in valuing the plan in Hertz to reflect the increase at the
time of dissolution. Id. at 651.
64. 98 N.M. 737, 652 P.2d 1188 (1982).
65. Whenry v. Whenry, Neave v. Neave, Bowden v. Bowden, Stroshine v. Stroshine, Durocher
v. Durocher, and Atler v. Atler. The opinion for all six cases appears at 98 N.M. 737, 652 P.2d
1188 (1983).
66. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). Following McCarty, the New Mexico Supreme Court overruled prior
New Mexico community property law and held that military retirement benefits were not community
property. Espinda v. Espinda, 96 N.M. 712, 713, 634 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1981).
67. McCarty was decided on June 26, 1981. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 210. The six cases decided
before McCarty were decided on the basis of well-established New Mexico law.
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Stroshine, the trial court applied McCarty prospectively and relieved the
military spouse of payments after September 24, 1981. On appeal, the
6
supreme court reversed Stroshine and affirmed the five other decisions . 8
The court held that McCarty had no retroactive effect on final, unappealed
judgments that were valid under prior New Mexico law subsequently
overruled by McCarty.69 In these cases, the portion of military retirement
pay that was adjudged community property under prior New Mexico law
was to remain community property.
The supreme court granted rehearing in Stroshine, the only case involving military disability retirement pay. On rehearing, the court held
that this pay was community property subject to division. 7 ° The court
found nothing in McCarty indicating federal preemption of the state's
community property law with respect to disability retirement pay.7 Reaffirming its order in Whenry,72 the court ordered that Wife continue to
receive her payments. Military disability retirement pay, therefore, continues to be community property in New Mexico even though the recent
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act specifically excludes
such pay from its provisions."
E. The Uniform Services Former Spouses' ProtectionAct
The Supreme Court in McCarty speculated that ". . . Congress may
well decide . . . that more protection should be afforded a former spouse
of a retired service member." 74 The year following McCarty, Congress
enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act75 (hereinafter the Act). The Act reverses McCarty: "[slubject to the limitations
of this section,76 a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay
payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either
as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his
spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court." 77
The Act does not require the marriage to have lasted any given number
68. 98 N.M. at 741, 652 P.2d at 1192.
69. Id. at 740, 652 P.2d at 1191. See infra text accompanying notes 76-137 for a discussion of
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, overruling McCarty.
70. 98 N.M. at 743, 652 P.2d at 1194.
71. McCarty specifically limited its holding to nondisability retirement pay. 453 U.S. at 213.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 70.
73. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (1982) provides in pertinent part: "Disposable retired or retainer pay
means the total monthly . . . pay . . . (other than the retired pay of a member retired for disability .... )" See infra text accompanying notes 76-138 for a discussion of that Act.
74. 453 U.S. at 235-36.
75. The Act amends certain sections of Title 10, United States Code. The bulk of the Act is in
a new section, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
76. For a discussion of the limitations see infra text accompanying notes 102-20.
77. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982).
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of years in order to divide the retirement pay.7" The Act became effective
on February 1, 1983. 79
Cases finally decided before McCarty should present no problems in
New Mexico. At least since LeClert v. LeClert, ° the New Mexico Supreme Court has considered military retirement pay community property,
divisible upon divorce. Those cases remain unaffected by McCarty because McCarty was not given retroactive effect in New Mexico. 8 Those
direct enforcement provisions under the Act, however, are available to
former spouses only to enforce orders for payment that were8 2in effect on
June 26, 1981, without regard to subsequent modifications.
Read literally, Section (c)(1) of the Act " could be interpreted to mean
that courts may divide retirement pay only for those payments due after
June 26, 1981. The Act, however, has a dual purpose. It authorizes courts
to divide retirement pay according to the law of the jurisdiction. According
to the legislative history, "[t]his power is returned to the courts retroactive
to June 26, 1981. "84 The Act also provides for a direct payment procedure.
Section 1408(c)(1) must be read with the effective date section for the
direct payment provisions, 5 which were intended to be available only
prospectively. As reflected in the conference report, 8 6 the intent of Congress clearly was to abrogate the effects of McCarty.87 Modifications of
pre-McCarty decisions, to effectuate that opinion finalized before the
effective date of the Act, should not be given effect.
The same reasoning should yield the same result in those cases finally
decided after McCarty but before the effective date of the Act: McCarty
should not be given effect.8 " Psomas v. Psomas9 was tried after McCarty
78. The enforcement mechanism for direct payments to the non-military spouse is available,
however, only to former spouses whose marriage lasted for ten or more years of military service.
Id.§ 1408(d)(2) (1982). For the discussion of the direct enforcement provisions see infra text
accompanying notes 121-32.
79. The first day of the first month more than 120 days after the President signed the Act. 10
U.S.C. § 1006 (1982).
80. 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
81. See supra text accompanying note 70.
82. 10 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1982).
83. See supra text accompanying note 79.
84. S. Rep. No. 97-502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1596, 1611.
85. 10 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1982).
86. H. Rep. No. 97-749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 167-68, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 1569-73.
87. S. Rep. No. 97-502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1596: "The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect of the United States Supreme
Court decision in McCarty v. McCarty ...." Id.
88. Two commentators differ on this point. Compare Newton & Trail, Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act: A Legislative Answer to the McCarty Problem, 46 Tex. B.J. 291, 296
(agreeing with this result) with Peppy, Reconsidering the Rules for MilitaryBenefits, 5 Fam. Advoc.
30, 33 (Spring 1983) (finding that the Act does not provide relief for aggrieved spouses who had
final judgments entered after McCarty and before the effective date of the Act).
89. 99 N.M. 606, 661 P.2d 884 (1982).
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but before the effective date of the Act. Husband filed for divorce in
August 1981. The trial court deferred entering a final decree (for reasons
other than the issue of military retirement pay) and certified for appeal a
partial non-final decree on child support and alimony issues." The issue
of whether or not Husband's military retirement pay was community
property was not litigated at trial9 1 because of McCarty and Espinda v.
Espinda.92 After Wife filed her Answer Brief on appeal, she moved to
reverse and remand the case based on the Act.93 The supreme court denied
the motion. 94 The court reasoned that by failing to cross-appeal on the
issue of the community property status of Husband's military retirement
pay, wife had failed to preserve the issue for appeal." Moreover, the
court found nothing in the Act indicating that Congress intended any part
96
of it to have retroactive effect. That finding is incorrect.
Reopening the final division of property in a case decided after McCarty
and before the effective date of the Act could be difficult, notwithstanding
the Act. A final nonmodifiable judgment of property settlement may be
modified or set aside only on appeal or by filing a motion for relief under
New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 97 Under the rule, relief may
be available on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the adverse party. 98 Those reasons usually would not be present
in a property division based on McCarty, and those reasons are timebarred after one year. 99
A court's authority to divide military retirement pay is subject to several
significant limitations: a court may only divide disposable retired or re90. Id. at 607, 661 P.2d at 885. The husband also appealed the court's deferral of the final decree.
See infra text accompanying note 134.
91. During the period when bills were submitted to Congress to overrule McCarty, California
trial courts granted divorces but retained jurisdiction over property issues in order to give nonmilitary spouses the benefit of whatever Congress did to ameliorate the effect of McCarty. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Bennett, 131 Cal. App. 3d 299, 182 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1982), in which
the California Supreme Court ordered that its opinion not be officially published.
92. 96 N.M. 712, 634 P.2d 1264 (1981), following the holding in McCarty.
93. Psomas, 99 N.M. at 609, 661 P.2d at 887. This motion was filed after the Act had been
signed, but before its effective date. Wife's motion was filed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure for Civil Cases. The motion was not responded to, and the issue of what effect,
if any, the Act should have on the case was never briefed nor argued. Author's conversation with
the wife's counsel on appeal, July 12, 1983.
94. 99 N.M. at 609, 661 P.2d at 887.
95. Id.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90. The court corrected this finding in Walentowski
672 P.2d 657 (1983). The court held that the Act did apply
N.M. -,
v. Walentowski, retroactively to June 25, 1981 (the date of the McCarty decision) and overruled the statement in
Psomas to the contrary. Id. at __, 672 P.2d at 660. Walentowski did not discuss the problem of
reopening a final division of property that was based on McCarty before the effective date of the
Act. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
97. See, e.g., Parks v. Parks, 91 N.M. 369, 574 P.2d 588 (1978).
98. See, e.g., Unser v. Unser, 86 N.M. 648, 650, 654, 526 P.2d 790, 792, 796 (1974).
99. N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1980); Wehrle v. Robison, 92 N.M. 485, 590 P.2d
633 (1979).
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tainer pay as defined in the Act; ° the non-military spouse may not transfer
or otherwise dispose of the awarded portion of such pay;' °1 a court may
not order a military spouse to retire at a certain time in order to apply
the Act;"0 2 and a court may not use the Act to divide such pay unless it
has jurisdiction over the military spouse for reasons other than his residence in the jurisdiction only pursuant to military orders. 0 3
Disposable retired or retainer pay may not remain a fixed dollar amount.
It is defined" ° as the total monthly retired or retainer pay less required
deductions for amounts owed to the United States by the military spouse,"°5
amounts waived in order to receive compensation under Title 5 or Title
38," and certain taxes and government life insurance premiums.0 7 In
addition, the military spouse may elect to provide an annuity under the
Survivor Benefit Plan for the former spouse receiving payments under
the Act,0 8 and the payments for the annuity are deducted to determine
disposable pay. " By making certain elections permitted by the Act, either
before or after divorce, therefore, the military spouse can change the
One possible way to reopen a final division of property based on McCarty would be a motion,
within a "reasonable time," under N.M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), which provides for relief from a final
judgment because "a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." No New Mexico
cases were found construing this portion of Rule 60(b). Federal Rule 60(b)(5) is identical to that of
New Mexico. Professor Moore's discussion of the rule indicates that seeking to use the rule as
suggested would be unusual. The section of the rule providing for relief in a case when a prior
judgment on which it is based is reversed has been used to reverse on appeal in a second case whose
judgment was based on a prior case that was reversed on appeal in the same court. 7 J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice 60.26[3] (2d ed. 1983). The section of the rule providing for relief when
it is no longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application has been used chiefly to
vacate a permanent injunction which, while proper when entered, has become of no benefit to the
one whose rights were protected, or because of conditions occurring since the injunction, it would
be inequitable to continue it. Id. at 60.26[4].
100. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1408(c)(1), 1408(a)(4) (1982).
101. Id. § 1408(c)(2).
102. Id. § 1408(c)(3).
103. Id. § 1408(c)(4). Domicile in the jurisdiction or consent to the jurisdiction suffice. Id.
104. Id. § 1408(a)(4).
105. Id. § 1408(a)(4)(A).
106. Id. § 1408(a)(4)(B). Title 5 provides for the reduction of retired or retainer pay of a retired
military member who is employed in the civil service. 5 U.S.C. § 5532 (1982). Title 38 provides
for a waiver of retirement pay to receive certain pensions or compensation from the Veterans'
Administration. 38 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
107. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (a)(4)(C), (D), (E) (1982).
108. Id. § 1447, 1448, 1450.
109. Id. § 1408(a)(F). If a military member is recalled to active duty, he no longer receives retired
or retainer pay, and payments under the Act cease for the period of active duty. S. Rep. No. 97502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1596, 1610. See
also Comment, McCartyism in New Mexico: McCarty v. McCarty and The Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 665, 681 (1983), for a discussion of how the
number of dependants of a military member affects the amount of retired pay.
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amount of disposable retired or retainer pay. The amount also can change
because of increases or decreases in taxes."' In New Mexico, courts
should order fifty percent of the disposable pay rather than a fixed dollar
amount to be paid to the non-military spouse"'. and divide all other
community property equally to reduce the effect of some of these options
granted to the military spouse.
The non-transferability of the award to the non-military spouse makes
the disposable retired or retainer pay a kind of property other than community property." 2 Until the non-military spouse actually receives a payment under the Act, he cannot treat the award of his share as his separate
property; it cannot be sold, assigned, transferred, or devised." 3
The jurisdictional limitations for dividing disposable pay under the
Act"' were intended to prevent "forum shopping" by either party for the
most advantageous jurisdiction in which to commence divorce proceedings. 5 This provision of the Act should not present significant problems
in New Mexico because this state will look to the law of the state in
which the parties acquired the property to be divided. 1 6 Thus, if a New
Mexico court obtains jurisdiction to decree a divorce over a military
spouse by virtue of N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-4-5,"' and that spouse is in
New Mexico only pursuant to a military assignment, the court can divide
the disposable retired or retainer pay pursuant to the Act, so long as the
court uses the law of the military spouse's domicile."'
The direct enforcement mechanism for payment pursuant to a property
division to former spouses is available to those spouses who were married
for ten years or more during which the military spouse earned credit
toward retirement." 9 Direct enforcement is effected by service on the
110. The Act probably preempts a court's authority to enjoin a military spouse from exercising
those rights that might reduce disposable pay. See supra notes 107-111 and the sections of the Act
cited therein.
111. Either method is permitted by the Act. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (a)(2)(C) (1982).
112. See LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969), holding that retirement benefits
are a form of employee compensation and the portion of the benefits earned during marriage is
community property.
113. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2) (1982).
114. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. S. Rep. No. 97-502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1596, 1603.
116. See Stephens v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 1,595 P.2d 1196 (1979), dividing Husband's military
retirement according to the law of Tennessee, which was Husband's domicile.
117. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1983) provides for divorce jurisdiction over military
members stationed in New Mexico.
118. S. Rep: No. 97-502, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1596, 1604. In this regard, the Act probably preempts California's "quasi-community property"
law. Cal. Civ. Code §§4800, 4803 (West 1983).
119. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(2) (1982). Direct enforcement of payments for alimony and child support
is available, however, without regard to the ten year limitation. Id.
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appropriate Secretary or his designated agent12° of a final 2 ' court order
of divorce, dissolution, annulment,' 22 or legal separation, or a final order
modifying a prior decree. 123 The service is effective if the "court order"
is regular on its face, 124 identifies the military spouse and includes his
social security number, and the order or other documents served with the
order certify that his rights were observed pursuant to the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. 125 The Secretary or his agent must begin
payments under the Act within ninety days after service of the court
order.126 Payments may not exceed fifty percent of the disposable retired
or retainer pay;12 ' however, "any means available under law" including
the garnishment provisions of 42 U.S.C. §659 may be used to satisfy
amounts ordered by a court and unsatisfied by the Act.'28 Sixty-five percent
of the disposable retired or retainer pay is the aggregate maximum that
may be paid under the Act to satisfy a court order and legal process under
129
42 U.S.C. § 659, or court orders from more than one former spouse.
Payments under the Act terminate by the terms of the court order or upon
either the death of30the military spouse or the non-military spouse, whichever occurs first.
In Psomas v. Psomas, 31 the trial court deferred entering the final decree
of divorce because of concern for Wife's health needs. 31 2 Military insurance could cover the expenses of an operation that Wife needed as long
as no divorce had been granted. The supreme court held that when a
statutory ground for divorce is proved, the court is without jurisdiction
120. Service may be personal or by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested. Id.

§ 1408(b)(l)(A).
121. Direct payments are not available pending an appeal. Id. §1408(a)(3).
122. It is only in connection with a final decree or a court order that "annulment" appears in the
Act. Elsewhere, the Act speaks of "spouses," "former spouses," and of "marriage." It appears that
so long as state law provides for payments of child support or alimony upon the annulment of an
invalid marriage, enforcement of those payments is available under the Act. See, e.g., N.M. Stat.
Ann. §40-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
123. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2) (1982).
124. See id.§ 1408(b)(2).
125. Id.§ 1408(b)(1).
126. Id.§1408(d)(1). The court order should be served as soon as it is final even if the military
spouse has not yet retired at the time of the divorce. In that case, payments will begin within ninety
days of the retirement date. Id.
127. Id.§ 1408(e)(1).
128. Id. § 1408(e)(6).
129. Id. § 1408(e)(4)(B). Successive court orders will be satisfied on a first come, first served
basis. Id. § 1408(e)(4)(A). The Act provides procedures for dealing with conflicting court orders,
and orders providing for payment of more than the maximum allowed. Id.§§ 1408(e)(3)(A), 1408(c)(5).
130. Id.§ 1408(e)(4).
131. See supra note 91.
132. 99 N.M. at 607, 661 P.2d at 885. In State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 85 N.M. 575, 514 P.2d
851 (1973), the trial court denied a divorce for the same reason.
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to deny or defer granting a divorce.' 33 Under the Act, a former spouse
such as Mrs. Psomas,1 4 is entitled to continue as a dependent of the
military spouse for the purposes of obtaining military medical benefits
so long as she does not remarry, does not have medical coverage under
an employer-sponsored health plan, and was married to the military spouse
for at least twenty years of military service.' 35
The Act's restoration of a former spouse's right to share in the military
spouse's retirement benefits is only partial because of the significant
limitations discussed above.' 3 6 The Act, however, provides to former
spouses major new rights for direct enforcement of orders providing for
payments for alimony, child support, and for the division of property.

133. 99 N.M. at 608, 661 P.2d at 886.
134. The parties were married in 1952. id. at 607, 661 P.2d at 885.
135. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072(2)(F), 1076(b), 1986(c) (1982). Certain unmarried former spouses also
are entitled to commissary and post exchange privileges under the Act. Id. § 1005.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 102-20.

